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Abstract
Makingvital disk data recoverableevenin the eventof
OS compromises has become a necessity, in view of the
increased prevalence of OS vulnerability exploits over
the recent years. We present the design and implemen-
tation of a secure disk system, SVSDS, that performs
selective, ﬂexible, and transparent versioning of stored
data, at the disk-level. In addition to versioning, SVSDS
actively enforces constraints to protect executables and
system log ﬁles. Most existing versioning solutions that
operate at the disk-level are unaware of the higher-level
abstractions of data, and hence are not customizable. We
evolve a hybrid solution that combines the advantages
of disk-level and ﬁle-system—level versioning systems
thereby ensuring security, while at the same time allow-
ing ﬂexible policies. We implemented and evaluated a
software-level prototype of SVSDS in the Linux kernel
and it shows that the space and performance overheads
associated with selective versioning at the disk level are
minimal.
1 Introduction
Protecting disk data against malicious damage is one
of the key requirements in computer systems security.
Stored data is one the most valuable assets for most or-
ganizations and damage to such data often results in ir-
recoverable loss of money and man power. In today’s
computer systems, vulnerabilities in the OS are not un-
common. OS attacks through root kits, buffer overﬂows,
or malware cause serious threat to critical applications
and data. In spite of this, security policies and mecha-
nisms are built at the OS level in most of today’s com-
puter systems. This results in wide-scale system com-
promise when an OS vulnerability is exploited, making
the entire disk data open to attack.
To protect disk data even in the event of OS compro-
mises, securitymechanismshaveto existat a layerbelow
the OS, such as the disk ﬁrmware. These mechanisms
must not be overridable even by the highest privileged
OS user, so that even if a malicious attacker gains OS
root privileges, disk data would be protected.
Building security mechanisms at the disk-level comes
with a key problem: traditional disk systems lack higher-
level semantic knowledge and hence cannot implement
ﬂexible policies. For example, today’s disk systems can-
not differentiate between data and meta-data blocks or
even identify whether a particular disk block is being
used or is free. Disks have no knowledge of higher-level
abstractions such as ﬁles or directories and hence are
constrained in providing customized policies. This gen-
eral problem of lack of informationat the lower layers of
the system is commonly referred to as the “information-
gap” in the storage stack. Several existing works aim at
bridging this information-gap[4,11,16,18].
In this paper, we present the design and implementa-
tion of SVSDS, a secure disk system that transparently
performs selective versioning of key data at the disk-
level. By preserving older versions of data, SVSDS pro-
vides a window of time where data damaged by mali-
cious attacks can be recovered through a secure admin-
istrative interface. In addition to this, SVSDS enforces
two key constraints: read-only and append-only, to pro-
tect executable ﬁles and system activity logs which are
helpful for intrusion detection.
In SVSDS, we leverage the idea of Type-Safe Disks
(TSD) [16] to obtain higher-level semantic knowledge at
thedisk-levelwithminimalmodiﬁcationstostoragesoft-
ware such as ﬁle systems. By instrumenting ﬁle systems
to automatically communicate logical block pointers to
the disk system, a TSD can obtain three key pieces of
informationthat are vital forimplementingﬂexible secu-
rity policies. First, by identifying blocks that have out-
going pointers, a TSD differentiates between data and
meta-data. Second, a TSD differentiates between used
and unused blocks, by just identifying blocks that have
no incoming pointers (and hence not reachable from anymeta-data block). Third, a TSD knows higher abstrac-
tions such as ﬁles and directories by just enumerating
blocks in a sub-tree of the pointer hierarchy. For exam-
ple, the sub-tree of blocks starting from an inode block
of an Ext2 ﬁle system belong to a collection of ﬁles.
Using this semantic knowledge, SVSDS aggressively
versions all meta-data blocks, as meta-data impact the
accessibility of normal data, and hence is more impor-
tant. It also provides an interface through which ad-
ministrators can choose speciﬁc ﬁles or directories for
versioning, or for enforcing operation-based constraints
(read-only or append-only). SVSDS uses its knowledge
of free and used blocks to place older versions of meta-
data and chosen data, and virtualizes the block address-
space. Older versions of blocks are not accessible to
higher layers, except through a secure administrative in-
terface upon authentication using a capability.
We implemented a prototype of SVSDS in the Linux
kernel as a pseudo-device driver and evaluated its cor-
rectness and performance. Our results show that the
overheadsof selective disk-level versioningis quite min-
imal. For a normal user workload SVSDS had a small
overhead of 1% compared to regular disks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describe background. Section 3 discusses the
threat model. Section 4 and Section 5 explain the de-
sign and implementation of our system respectively. In
Section 6, we discuss the performance evaluation of our
prototype implementation. Related work is discussed in
Section 7 and we conclude in Section 8.
2 Background
Data protection has been a major focus of systems re-
search in the past decade. Inadvertent user errors, ma-
licious intruders, and malware applications that exploit
vulnerabilitiesin operatingsystems have exacerbatedthe
need for stronger data protection mechanisms. In this
section we ﬁrst talk about versioning as a means for pro-
tectingdata. We thengivea briefdescriptionaboutTSDs
to make the paper self-contained.
2.1 Data Versioning
Versioningdata is a widely acceptedsolutionto data pro-
tection especially for data recovery. Versioning has been
implementedindifferentlayers. Ithasbeenimplemented
above the operating system (in applications), inside the
operating system (e.g., in ﬁle systems) and beneath the
operating system (e.g., inside the disk ﬁrmware). We
now discuss the advantages and disadvantages of ver-
sioning at the different layers.
Application-level versioning. Application-level ver-
sioningisprimarilyusedforsourcecodemanagement[1,
2,22]. The main advantage of these systems is that they
provide the maximum ﬂexibility as users can control ev-
erythingfromchoosingthe versioningapplicationto cre-
ating new versions of ﬁles. The disadvantage with these
systems is that they lack transparency and users can eas-
ilybypasstheversioningmechanism. Theversioneddata
istypicallystoredinaremoteserverandbecomesvulner-
able when the remote server’s OS gets compromised.
File-system–level versioning. Several ﬁle systems
support versioning [6,10,12,15,19]. These systems are
mainlydesignedto allows users to access and revertback
to previous versions of ﬁles. The older versions of ﬁles
are typically stored under a hidden directory beneath its
parent directory or on a separate partition. As these ﬁle
systems maintain older versions of ﬁles, they can also be
used for recovering individual ﬁles and directories in the
eventofanintrusion. Unlikeapplication-levelversioning
systems, ﬁle-system–levelversioningis usually transpar-
ent to higher layers. The main advantage of these ver-
sioning systems is that they can selectively version ﬁles
and directories and can also support ﬂexible versioning
policies (e.g.,users can choosedifferentpolicies foreach
ﬁle or directory). Once a ﬁle is marked for versioning by
the user, the ﬁle system automatically starts versioning
the ﬁle data. The main problem with ﬁle-system–level
versioning is that their security is closely tied to the se-
curity of the operating system. When the operating sys-
tem is compromised, an intruder can bypass the security
checks and change the data stored in the disk.
Disk-level versioning. The other alternative is to
version blocks inside the disk [7,20,23]. The main
advantage of this approach is that the versioning mech-
anism is totally decoupled from the operating system
and hence can make data recoverable even when the
operating system is compromised. The disadvantage
with block-based disk-level versioning systems is that
they cannot selectively version ﬁles as they lack seman-
tic information about the data stored inside them. As a
result, in most cases they end up versioning all the data
inside the disk which causes them to have signiﬁcant
amount of space overheads in storing versions.
In summary, application-level versioning is weak
in terms of security as can be easily bypassed by users.
Also, the versioning mechanism is not transparent to
users and can be easily disabled by intruders. File-
system—level data-protection mechanisms provide
transparency and also ﬂexibility in terms of what data
needs to be versioned but they do not protect the data in
the event of an operatingsystem compromise. Disk-levelversioning systems provide better security than both
application and ﬁle system level versioning but they do
not provide any ﬂexibility to the users to select the data
that needs to be versioned. What we propose is a hybrid
solution, i.e., combine the strong security that the
disk-level data versioning provide, with the ﬂexibility of
ﬁle-system—level versioning systems.
2.2 Type-Safe Disks
Today’s block-based disks cannot differentiate between
blocktypesduetothelimitedexpressivenessofthe block
interface. All higher-level operations such as ﬁle cre-
ation, deletion, extension, renaming, etc. are translated
into a set of block read and write requests. Hence, they
do not convey any semantic knowledge about the blocks
they modify. This problem is popularly known as the in-
formation gap in the storage stack [4,5], and constrains
disk systems with respect to the range of functionality
that they can provide.
Pointers are the primary mechanisms by which data is
organized. Mostimportantly,pointersdeﬁnereachability
of blocks; i.e., a block that is not pointed to by any other
block cannot be reached or accessed. Almost all popular
data structures used for storing information use pointers.
Forexample,ﬁle systems anddatabasesystems makeex-
tensive use of pointers to organize the data stored in the
disk. Storage mechanisms employed by databases like
indexes, hash, lists, and b-trees use pointers to convey
relationships between blocks.
Pointers are the smallest unit through which ﬁle sys-
tems organize data into semantically meaningful entities
such as ﬁles and directories. Pointers deﬁne three things:
(1)thesemantic dependencybetweenblocks; (2)thelog-
icalgroupingofblocks;and(3)theimportanceofblocks.
Even though pointers provide vast amounts of informa-
tion about relationships among blocks, today’s disks are
oblivious to pointers. A Type-Safe Disk (TSD) is a disk
system that is aware of pointer information and can use
it to enforce invariants on data access and also perform
varioussemantic-awareoptimizationswhich are not pos-
sible in today’s disk systems.
TSDs widen the traditional block-based interface to
enable the software layers to communicate pointer infor-
mation to the disk. File systems that use TSDs should
use the disk APIs (CREATE PTR, DELETE PTR, AL-
LOC BLOCK, GETFREE) exported by TSDs to allocate
blocks, create and delete pointers, and get free-space in-
formation from the disk.
The pointer manager in TSDs keeps track of the re-
lationship among blocks stored inside the disk. The
pointer operations supported by TSDs are CREATE PTR
and DELETE PTR. Both operations take two arguments:
source and destination block numbers. The pointer
manager uses a P-TABLE (or pointer table) to main-
tain the relationship among blocks inside the disk. En-
tries are added to and deleted from the P-TABLE during
CREATE PTR and DELETE PTR operations. When there
are no incoming pointers to a block it is automatically
garbage collected by the TSD.
One other important difference between a regular disk
and a TSD is that the ﬁle systems no longer does free-
space management (i.e., ﬁle systems no longer need to
maintain bitmaps to manage free space). The free-space
management is entirely moved to the disk. TSDs export
ALLOC BLOCK API to allow ﬁle systems to request new
blocks from the disk. The ALLOC BLOCK API takes a
reference block number, a hint block number, and the
number of blocks as arguments and allocates the re-
questednumberofﬁle system blocksfromthediskmain-
tained free block list. After allocating the new blocks,
TSD creates pointers from the reference block to each of
the newly allocated blocks.
The garbage-collection process performed in TSDs is
different from the traditional garbage-collection mecha-
nism employedin most programminglanguages. A TSD
reclaims back the deleted blocks in an online fashion as
opposedto thetraditionalofﬂinemechanisminmost pro-
gramming languages. TSDs maintain a reference count
(or the number of incoming pointers) for each block.
When the reference count of a block decreases to zero,
the block is garbage-collected; the space is reclaimed by
thediskandtheblockis addedtothelist offreeblocks. It
is important to note that it is the pointer information pro-
vided by TSD that allows the disk to track the liveness of
blocks, which cannot be done in traditional disks [17].
3 Threat Model
Broadly,SVSDS providesa securityboundaryat the disk
level and makes vital data recoverable even when an at-
tacker obtains root privileges. In our threat model, ap-
plications and the OS are untrusted, and the storage sub-
system comprising the ﬁrmware and magnetic media is
trusted. The OS communicates with the disk through a
narrow interface that does not expose the disk internal
versioning data. Our model assumes that the disk sys-
tem is physically secure, and the disk protects against at-
tackers that compromise a computer system through the
network. This scenario covers a major class of attacks
inﬂicted on computer systems today.
Speciﬁcally, an SVSDS provides the following guar-
antees:
• All meta-data and chosen ﬁle data marked for pro-
tection will be recoverable to an arbitrary previous
state even if an attacker maliciously deletes or over-
writes the data, after compromising the OS. Thedepth of history available for recovery is solely de-
pendent on the amount of free-space available on
disk. Given the fact that disk space is cheap, this is
an acceptable dependency.
• Data items explicitly marked as read-only is guar-
anteed to be intact against any malicious deletion or
overwriting.
• Data items marked as append-only can never be
deleted or overwritten by any OS attacker.
It is important to note that SVSDS is designed to pro-
tect the data stored on the disk and does not provide
any guarantee on which binaries/ﬁles are actually exe-
cuted by the OS (e.g., rootkits could change the binaries
in memory). As ﬁles with operation-based constraints
(speciﬁcally read-only constraints) cannot be modiﬁed
inside SVSDS, upon a reboot, the system running on
SVSDS would return to a safe state (providedthe system
executables and conﬁguration ﬁles are marked as read-
only).
4 Design
Our aim while designing SVSDS is to combine the se-
curity of disk-level versioning, with the ﬂexibility of
versioning at higher-layers such as the ﬁle system. By
transparently versioning data at the disk-level, we make
data recoverable even in the event of OS compromises.
However, today’s disks lack information about higher-
level abstractions of data (such as ﬁles and directories),
and hence cannot support ﬂexible versioning granulari-
ties. To solve this problem, we leverage Type-Safe Disks
(TSDs) [16] and exploit higher-level data semantics at
the disk-level.
Type-safe disks export an extended block-based in-
terface to ﬁle systems. In addition to the regular
block readand write primitivesexportedbytraditional
disks, TSDs support pointer management primitives that
can be used by ﬁle systems to communicate pointer-
relationships between disk blocks. For example, an Ext2
ﬁle system can communicate the relationships between
aninodeblockofa ﬁleandits correspondingdatablocks.
Through this, logical abstractions of most ﬁle systems
can be encoded and communicated to the disk system.
Figure 1 shows the on-disk layout of Ext2. As seen
from Figure 1, ﬁles and directories can be identiﬁed us-
ing pointers by just enumeratingblocks of sub-trees with
inode or directory blocks as root.
The overall goals of SVSDS are the following:
• Performblock versioningat the disk-level in a com-
pletely transparent manner such that higher-level
software (such as ﬁle systems or user applications)
Inode Block Directory Block Data Block SB IB DB DirB Super Block
IB IB IB IB IB
DB DB DB DB DB
IB
DirB DirB DirB
DirB DB
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Legend:
Figure1: PointerrelationshipinsideanFFS-likeﬁle sys-
tem
cannot bypass it. System administrators or users
can set up versioning policies or revert and delete
versions through an ofﬂine privileged channel after
a capability-based authentication process enforced
by the disk system.
• Aggressivelyversion all meta-data (e.g., Ext2 inode
blocks) and chosen data as perthe policies set up by
administrators or users. In the perspective of a ﬁle
system, versioning policies must be at granularities
of individual ﬁles or directories.
• Enforce basic constraints at the disk-level, such as
read-only and append-only. Users must be able to
choose speciﬁc ﬁles or directories to be protected
by these constraints.
Figure2showstheoverallarchitectureofSVSDS.The
threemajorcomponentsinSVSDS are, (1)Storagevirtu-
alization Layer (SVL), (2) The Version Manager, and (3)
The Constraint Manager. The SVL virtualizes the block
address space and manages physical space on the device.
The version manager automatically versions meta-data
and user-selected ﬁles and directories. It also provides
an interface to revert back the disk state to previous ver-
sions. The constraint manager enforces read-only and
append-only operation-level constraints on ﬁles and di-
rectories inside the disk.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 4.1 describe how transparent versioning is per-
formed inside SVSDS. Section 4.2 talks about the ver-
sioning mechanism. Section 4.4 describes our recov-
ery mechanism and how an administrator recovers af-
ter detecting an OS intrusion. Section 4.5 describes how
SVSDS enforces operation based constraints on ﬁles andS
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Figure 2: Architecture of SVSDS
directories. Finally, in Section 4.6, we discuss some of
the issues with SVSDS.
4.1 Transparent Versioning
Transparent versioning is an important requirement, as
SVSDS has to ensure that the versioning mechanism is
not bypassed by higher layers. To provide transparent
versioning, the storage virtualization layer (SVL) virtu-
alizes the disk address space. The SVL splits the disk ad-
dress space into two: logical and physical, and internally
maintains the mapping between them. The logical ad-
dress space is exposed to ﬁle systems and the SVL trans-
lates logical addresses to physical ones for every disk
request. This enables SVL to transparently change the
underlying physical block mappings when required, and
applications are completely oblivious to the exact physi-
cal location of a logical block.
SVSDS maintains T-TABLE (or translation table),
to store the relationship between logical and physical
blocks. There is a one-to-one relationship between each
logical and physical block in the T-TABLE. A version
number ﬁeld is also added to each entry of T-TABLE to
denote the last version in which a particular block was
modiﬁed. Also, a status ﬂag is added to each T-TABLE
entry to indicate the type (meta-data or data), and sta-
tus (versioned or non-versioned) of each block. The T-
TABLE is indexed by the logical block number and every
allocated block has an entry in the T-TABLE. When ap-
plications read (or write) blocks, the SVL looks up the
T-TABLE forthelogical blockandredirectsthe requestto
the corresponding physical block stored in the T-TABLE
entry.
Free-Space Management SVSDS has two different
address spaces, whereas the regularTSDs only have one.
Hence, SVSDS cannot reuse the existing block alloca-
tion mechanism of regular TSDs. To manage both ad-
dress spaces, the SVL uses two different bitmaps: log-
ical block bitmaps (LBITMAPS) in addition to the exist-
ing physical block bitmaps (PBITMAPS). SVSDS uses
a two-phased block allocation process. During the ﬁrst
phase, the SVL allocates the requested number of physi-
cal blocks from PBITMAPS. The allocation request need
not always succeed as some of the physical blocks are
used for storing the previous versions of blocks. If the
physical block allocation request succeeds, it proceeds
to the next phase. In the second phase, the SVL allocates
an equal number of logical blocks from LBITMAPS. It
then associates each of the newly allocated logical block
with a physical block and adds an entry in the T-TABLE
for each pair. The ﬂags for these new entries are copied
from the reference block passed to the ALLOC BLOCK
callandtheversionnumberis copiedfromthediskmain-
tained version number. This ensures that all blocks that
are added later to a ﬁle inherit the same attributes (or
ﬂags) as their parent block.
4.2 Creating versions
The version manageris responsible for creating new ver-
sions and maintaining previous versions of data on the
disk. Theversionmanagerprovidestheﬂexibility ofﬁle-
system–level versioning while operating inside the disk.
By default, it versions all meta-data blocks. In addi-
tion, it can also selectively versionuser-selected ﬁles and
directories. The version manager automatically check-
points the meta-data and chosen data blocks at regular
intervals of time, and performs copy-on-write upon sub-
sequent modiﬁcations to the data. The version manager
maintains a global version number and increments it af-
ter every checkpoint interval. The checkpoint interval is
the time interval after which the version number is au-
tomatically incremented by the disk. SVSDS allows an
administrator to specify the checkpoint interval through
its administrative interface.
The version manager maintains a table, V-TABLE (or
version table), to keep track of previous versions of
blocks. For each version, the V-TABLE has a separate
list of logical-to-physical block mappings for modiﬁed
blocks.
Once the current version is checkpointed, any subse-
quentwrite toa versionedblockcreatesa newversionfor
that block. During this write, the version manager also
backs up the existing logical to physical mapping in the
V-TABLE. To create a new version of a block, the version
manger allocates a new physical block through the SVL,
changes the corresponding logical block entry in the T-TABLE topointtothenewlyallocatedphysicalblock,and
updates the version number of this entry to the current
version. Figure 3 shows a V-TABLE with a few entries
in the mapping list for the ﬁrst three versions. Let’s take
a simple example to show how entries are added to the
V-TABLE. If block 3 is overwrittenin version2, the entry
in the T-TABLE for block 3 is added to the mapping list
of the previous version (i.e., version 1).
Versioning TSD Pointer Structures TSDs maintains
their own pointerstructures inside the disk to track block
relationships. The pointer management in TSDs was ex-
plained in Section 2.2. The pointers refers to the disk-
level pointers inside TSDs, unless otherwise mentioned
in the paper. As pointers are used to track block live-
ness information inside TSDs, the disk needs to keep its
pointerstructuresuptodate at all times. Whenthedisk is
reverted back to the previous version, the pointer opera-
tions performed in the current version have to be undone
for the disk to reclaim back the space used by the current
version.
To undo the pointer operations, SVSDS logs all
pointer operations to the pointer operation list of the cur-
rentversioninthe V-TABLE. Forexample,inFigure3the
ﬁrst entryin the pointeroperationlist forversion1 shows
thata pointerwas createdbetweenlogicalblocks3and8.
This create pointer operation has to be undone when the
disk is reverted back from version 1 to 0. Similarly, the
ﬁrst entry in the pointer operation list for version 3 de-
notes that a pointerwas deleted between logical blocks 3
and 8. This operation has to be undone when the disk is
reverted back from version 3 to version 2.
Toreducethespacerequiredtostorethepointeropera-
tions, SVSDS doesnotstorepointeroperationsonblocks
created and deleted (or deleted and created) within the
sameversion. Whena CREATE PTR isissuedwithsource
a and destination b in version x. During the lifetime of
the version x, if a DELETE PTR operation is called with
the same source a and destination b, then the version
manager removes the entry from the pointer operation
list for that version in the V-TABLE. We can safely re-
move these pointer operations because CREATE PTR and
DELETE PTR operationsare the inverseofeach otherand
would cancel out their changes when they occur with-
ing the same version. The recovery manager maintains a
hash table indexed on the source and destination pair for
efﬁcient retrieval of entries from the V-TABLE.
4.3 Selective Versioning
Current block-based disk systems lack semantic infor-
mation about the data being stored inside. As a result,
disk-level versioning systems [7,23] version all blocks.
But versioningall blocksinside the disk canquicklycon-
sume all available free space on the disk. Also, version-
ing all blocks is not efﬁcient for the following two rea-
sons: (1)shortlivedtemporarydata(e.g., datain the/tmp
folder and installation programs) need not be versioned,
and (2) persistent data blocks have varying levels of im-
portance. For example,in FFS-like ﬁle systems, version-
ing the super block, inode blocks, or indirect blocks is
more important than versioning data blocks as the for-
mer affects the reachability of other blocks stored inside
the disk. Hence, SVSDS selectively versions meta-data
and user-selected ﬁles and directories to provide deeper
version histories.
Versioning meta-data. Meta-data blocks have to be
versioned inside the disk for two reasons. First, reach-
ability: meta-data blocks affects the reachability of data
blocks that it points to (e.g., the data blocks can only be
reached through the inode or the indirect block). Sec-
ond, recovery of user-selected ﬁles: we need to preserve
all versions of the entire ﬁle system directory-structure
inside the disk to revert back ﬁles and directories.
To selectively version meta-data blocks, SVSDS
uses the pointer information available inside the TSDs.
SVSDS identiﬁes a meta-datablock duringthe ﬁrst CRE-
ATE PTR operationtheblockpassedasthesourceisiden-
tiﬁed as a meta-data block. For all source block passed
to the CREATE PTR operation, SVSDS marks it as meta-
data in the T-TABLE.
SVSDS defersreallocationofdeleted datablocks until
there are no free blocks available inside the disk. This
ensures that for a period of time the deleted data blocks
will still be valid and can be restored back when their
correspondingmeta-data blocks are reverted back during
recovery.
To version ﬁles and directories, applications issue an
ioctl to the ﬁle system that uses SVSDS. The ﬁle sys-
tem in turn locates the logical block number of the ﬁle’s
inode block, and calls the VERSION BLOCKS disk prim-
itive. VERSION BLOCKS is a new primitive added to the
existing disk interface for applications to communicate
the ﬁles for versioning (see Table 1). After the blocks of
the ﬁle are marked for versioning, the disk automatically
versions the marked blocks at regular intervals.
Versioning user-selected data. Versioning meta-data
blocks alone does not make the disk system more se-
cure. Users still want the disk to automatically version
certain ﬁles and directories. To selectively version ﬁles
and directories, applications and ﬁle systems only have
to pass the starting block (or the root of the subtree) un-
der which all the blocks needs to be versioned. For ex-
ample, in Ext2 only the inode block of the ﬁle or the di-
rectory needs to be passed for versioning. SVSDS doesVersion No.
Pointer Operation List
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Figure3: The v-tabledatastructure. A simpliﬁedv-tablestate is shown for ﬁrst three versions inSVSDS.Eachentry
in the old mapping list corresponds to logical and physical block pair. C & D in the pointer operation list represent
Create pointer and Delete pointer operations, respectively.
a Breadth First Search (BFS) on the P-TABLE, starting
fromthe root of the subtree. All the blockstraverseddur-
ing the BFS are marked for versioning in the T-TABLE.
One common issue in performing BFS is that there
could potentially be many cycles in the graph that is be-
ing traversed. For example, in the Ext2TSD [16] ﬁle
system, there is a pointer from the inode of the direc-
tory block, to the inode of the sub-directory block and
vice versa. Symbolic links are yet another source of cy-
cles. SVSDS detects cycles by maintaining a hash table
(D-TABLE) for blocks that have been visited during the
BFS. During each stage of the BFS, the version manager
checkstoseeif thecurrentlyvisitednodeis presentin the
D-TABLE before traversing the blocks pointed to by this
block. If the block is already present in the D-TABLE,
SVSDS skips the block as it was already marked for ver-
sioning. If not, SVSDS adds the currently visited block
to the D-TABLE before continuing with the BFS.
To identify blocks that are subsequently added to
versioned ﬁles or directories, SVSDS checks the ﬂags
present in the T-TABLE of the source block during the
CREATE PTR operations. This is because when ﬁle sys-
tems want to get a free block from SVSDS, they is-
sue an ALLOC BLOCK call with a reference block and
the number of required blocks as arguments. This
ALLOC BLOCK call is internally translated to a CRE-
ATE PTR operation with the reference block and the
newly allocated block as its arguments. If the reference
block is marked to be versioned, then the destination
block that it points to is also marked for versioning. File
systems normally pass the inode or the indirect block as
the reference block.
4.4 Reverting Versions
In the event of an intrusion or an operating system
compromise, an administrator would want to undo the
changes done by an intruder or a malicious application
by reverting back to a previous safe state of the disk. We
deﬁne reverting back to a previous versions as restoring
the disk state from time t to the disk state at time t - tv,
where tv is the checkpoint interval.
Even though SVSDS can access any previous ver-
sion’s data, we require reverting only one version at a
time. This is because SVSDS internally maintains state
about block relationships through pointers, and it re-
quires that the pointer information be properly updated
inside the disk to garbage-collect deleted blocks. To il-
lustrate the problem with reverting back to an arbitrary
version, let’s revert the disk state from version f to ver-
sion a by skipping reverting of the versions between f
and a. Reverting back the V-TABLE entries for version
a alone would not sufﬁce. As we directly jump to ver-
sion a, the blocks that were allocated, and pointers that
were created or deleted between versions f and a, are
not reverted back. The blocks present during version a
does not contain information about blocks created after
version a. As a result, blocks allocated after version a
becomes unreachable by applications but according to
pointer information in the P-TABLE they are still reach-
able. As a result, the disk will not reclaim back these
block and the we will be leaking disk space. Hence,
SVSDS allows an administrator to revert back only one
version at a time.
SVSDS also allows an administrator to revert back
the disk state to a arbitrary point in time by revert-
ing back one version at a time until the largest ver-
sion whose start time is less than or equal to the
time mentioned by the administrator is found. RE-
VERT TO PREVIOUS VERSION and REVERT TO TIMEDisk Primitives Description
Marks all blocks in the subtree starting from block BNo to be versioned.
VERSION BLOCKS(BNo) The data blocks present in the subtree will be versioned along with the
reference (or meta-data) blocks.
REVERT TO PREVIOUS VERSION Reverts back the disk state from current version to the previous version.
REVERT TO TIME(t) Reverts back the disk state one version at a time till it ﬁnds a version v
with start time less than or equal to t.
MARK READ ONLY(BNo) Marks all blocks in the sub-tree starting from block BNo as read-only.
Marks all blocks in the sub-tree starting from block BNo as
MARK APPEND ONLY(BNo) append-only. BNo itself will not be an append-onlyblock as it could be
a meta-data block, with non-sequential updates.
Table 1: Additional Disk APIs in SVSDS
are the additional primitives added to the existing disk
interfaceto revertbackversionsbytheadministrator(see
Table 1).
While reverting back to a previous version, SVSDS
recovers the data by reverting back the following: (1)
Pointers: the pointer operation that happened in the cur-
rent version are reverted back; (2) Meta-data: all meta-
data changes that happened in the current version are re-
verted back; (3) Data-blocks: all versioned data blocks
and some (or all) of the non-versioned deleted data-
blocks are reverted back (i.e., the non-versioned data
blocks that have been garbage collected cannot be re-
verted back); and (4) Bitmaps: both logical and physical
block bitmap changes that happened during the current
version are reverted.
4.4.1 Reverting Mapping
SVSDS reverts back to its previous version from the cur-
rent version in two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, it restores
all the T-TABLE entries stored in the mapping list of the
previous version in the V-TABLE. While restoring back
the T-TABLE entriesofthepreviousversion,therearetwo
cases that need to be handled. (1) An entry already ex-
ists in the T-TABLE for the logical block of the restored
mapping. (2) An entry does not exist. When an entry
exists in the T-TABLE, the current mapping is replaced
with the old physical block from the mapping list in the
V-TABLE. The currentphysicalblockis freedby clearing
the bit correspondingto the physical block numberin the
PBITMAPS. If an entry does not exist in the T-TABLE, it
implies that the block was deleted in the current version
and the mappingwas backedup in the V-TABLE. SVSDS
restores the mapping as a new entry in the T-TABLE and
the logical block is marked as used in the LBITMAPS.
The physical block need not be marked as used as it is
already alive. At the end of the ﬁrst phase, SVSDS re-
stores back all the versioned data that got modiﬁed or
deleted in the current version.
4.4.2 Reverting Pointer Operations
In the second phase of the recovery process, SVSDS re-
verts back the pointer operations performed in the cur-
rent version by applying the inverse of the pointer op-
erations. The inverse of the CREATE PTR operation is a
DELETE PTR operation and vice versa. The pointer op-
erations are reverted back to free up the space used by
blocks created in the current version and also for restor-
ing pointers deleted in the current version.
Reverting back CREATE PTR operations are straight
forward. SVSDS issues the corresponding DELETE PTR
operations. If there are no incoming pointers to the des-
tination blocks of the DELETE PTR operations, the disk
automatically garbage collects the destination blocks.
While reverting the DELETE PTR operations, SVSDS
checks if the destination blocks are present in the T-
TABLE. If yes, SVSDS executes the corresponding CRE-
ATE PTR operations. If the destination blocks is not
present in the T-TABLE, it implies that the DELETE PTR
operations were performed on non-versioned blocks. If
the destination blocks are present in the deleted block
list, SVSDS restores thebackedup T-TABLE entries from
the deleted block list and issues the corresponding CRE-
ATE PTR operations.
While revertingback to a previous version, the inverse
pointer operations have to be replayed in the reverse or-
der. If not, SVSDS would prematurely garbage collect
these blocks. We illustrate this problem with a simple
example. From Figure 4(a) we can see that block a has
a pointer to block b and block b has pointers to blocks c
and d. The pointers from b are ﬁrst deleted and then the
pointerfrom a to b is deleted. This is shown in Figs. 4(b)
and 4(c). If the inverse pointer operations are applied in
the same order, ﬁrst a pointer would be is created from
blockb to d (assumingpointerfrom b to d is deletedﬁrst)
but block b would be automatically garbage collected by
SVSDS as there are no incomingpointers to block b. Re-
playingpointeroperationsin thereverseorderavoidsthis
problem. Figs 4(d), 4(e), and 4(f) show the sequence of(a)
b
d
c
a a b
d
c
a b b a a b
d
c
(f)
a
(b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 4: Steps in reverting back delete pointer operations
steps performed while reverting back the delete pointer
operations in the reverse order. We can see that revert-
ing back pointer operations in the reverse order correctly
reestablishes the pointers in the correct sequence.
4.4.3 Reverting Meta-Data
SVSDS uses the mapping informationin the V-TABLE to
revert back changes to the meta-data blocks. There are
three cases that need to be handled while reverting back
meta-data blocks: (1) The meta-data block is modiﬁed
in the new version, (2) The meta-data block is deleted
in the new version, and (3) The meta-data block is ﬁrst
modiﬁed and then deleted in the new version. In the ﬁrst
case, the mappings that are backed up in the previous
version for the modiﬁed block in the V-TABLE are re-
stored. This is done to get back the previous contents
of the meta-data blocks. For the second case, the delete
pointer operations would have caused the T-TABLE en-
tries to be backed up in the V-TABLE as they would be
the last incoming pointer to the meta-data blocks. The
T-TABLE entries will be restored back in the ﬁrst phase
of the recovery process and the deleted pointers are re-
stored back in the second phase of the recovery process.
Reverting meta-data blocks when they are ﬁrst modiﬁed
and then deleted is the same as in reverting meta-data
blocks when they are deleted.
4.4.4 Reverting Data Blocks
When the recovery manager reverts back to a previous
version, it cannot revert back to the exact disk state in
mostcases. Torevertbacktothe exactdisk state, the disk
would need to revert mappings for all blocks, including
the data blocks that are not versioned by default. In a
typical TSD scenario, blocks are automatically garbage
collected as soon as the last incoming pointer to them
is deleted, making their recovery difﬁcult if not impos-
sible. The garbage collector in SVSDS tries to reclaim
the deleted data blocks as late as possible. To do this,
SVSDS maintains an LRU list of deleted non-versioned
blocks (also known as the deleted block list).
When the delete-pointer operations are reverted back,
SVSDS issues the corresponding create-pointer opera-
tions only if the deleted data blocks are still present in
the deleted block list. This policy of lazy garbagecollec-
tion allows users to recover the deleted data blocks that
have not yet been garbage collected yet.
Lazy garbage collection is also useful when a user re-
verts back the disk state after inadvertently deleting a di-
rectory. If all data blocks that belong to the directory are
not garbage collected, then the user can get back the en-
tire directory along with the ﬁles stored underit. If some
of the blocks are already reclaimed by the disk, the user
would get backthe deleteddirectorywith data missing in
someﬁles. EventhoughSVSDS doesnotversionall data
block, it still tries to restore back all deleted data blocks
when disk is revert back to its previous version.
4.4.5 Reverting Bitmaps
When data blocks are added or reclaimed back during
the recovery process the bitmaps have to be adjusted to
keep track of free blocks. The PBITMAPS need not be
restored back as they are never deleted. The physical
blocks are backed up either in the deleted block list or
in the old mapping lists in the V-TABLE. The physical
blocks that are addedin the currentversionare freeddur-
ing the ﬁrst and second phases of the recovery process.
During the ﬁrst phase, the previous version’s data is re-
storedfrommappinglist in the V-TABLE. Atthis time the
physical blocks of the newer version are marked free in
the PBITMAPS. When the pointers created in the current
version are reverted back by deleting them in the second
phase, the garbage collector frees both the physical and
the logical blocks, only if it is the last incoming pointer
to the destination block.
The LBITMAPS only have to be restored back for ver-
sioned blocks that have been deleted in the current ver-
sion. While restoring the backed up mappings from the
V-TABLE, SVSDS checks if the logical block is allocated
in the LBITMAPS. If it is not allocated, SVSDS reallo-
cates the deleted logical block by setting the correspond-
ing bit in the LBITMAPS. The deleted non-versioned
blocks need not be restored back. Previously, these
blocks were moved to the deleted block list and were
added back to the T-TABLE during the second phase of
the recovery process.4.5 Operation-based constraints
In addition to versioning data inside the disk, it is also
important to protect certain blocks from being modiﬁed,
overwritten, or deleted. SVSDS allows users to spec-
ify the types of operations that can be performed on a
block, and the constraint manager enforces these con-
straints during block writes. SVSDS enforces two types
of operation-based constraints: read-only and append-
only.
The sequence of steps taken by the operation man-
ager to mark a ﬁle as read-only or append-only is the
same as marking a ﬁle to be versioned. The steps for
marking a ﬁle to be versioned was described in Sec-
tion 4.3. While marking a group of blocks, the ﬁrst
block (or the root block of the subtree) encountered in
the breadth ﬁrst search is treated differently to accom-
modate special ﬁle system updates. For example, ﬁle
systems under UNIX support three timestamps: access
time (atime), modiﬁcation time (mtime), and creation
time (ctime). When data from a ﬁle is read, its atime
is updated in the ﬁle’s inode. Similarly, when the ﬁle
is modiﬁed, its mtime and ctime are updated in its in-
ode. To accommodate atime, mtime, and ctime updates
on the ﬁrst block, the constraint manager distinguishes
the ﬁrst block by adding a special meta-data block ﬂag
in the T-TABLE for the block. SVSDS disallows dele-
tion of blocks marked as read-only or append-only con-
straints. MARK READ ONLY and MARK APPEND ONLY
are the two new APIs that have beenaddedto the disk for
applicationstospecifytheoperation-basedconstraintson
blocks stored inside the disk. These APIs are described
in Table 1.
Read-only constraint. The read-only operation-based
constraint is implemented to make block(s) immutable.
For example, the system administrator could mark bi-
naries or directories that contain libraries as read-only,
so that later on they are not modiﬁed by an intruder or
any other malware application. Since SVSDS does not
have information about the ﬁle system data structures,
atimeupdatescannotbedistinguishedfromregularblock
writes using pointer information. SVSDS neglects (or
disallows) the atime updates on read-onlyblocks, as they
do not change the integrity of the ﬁle. Note that the read-
only constraint can also be applied to ﬁles that are rarely
updated (such as binaries). When such ﬁles have to be
updated, the read-onlyconstraint can be removedand set
back again by the administrator through the secure disk
interface.
Append-only constraint. Log ﬁles serve as an impor-
tant resource for intrusion analysis and statistics collec-
tion. The results of the intrusion analysis is heavily de-
pendent on the integrity of the log ﬁles. The operation-
based constraints implemented by SVSDS can be used
to protect log ﬁles from being overwritten or deleted by
intruders.
SVSDS allows marking any subtree in the pointer
chain as “append-only”. During a write to a block in
an append-only subtree, the operation manager allows
it only if the modiﬁcation is to change trailing zeroes
to non-zeroes values. SVSDS checks the difference be-
tween the original and the new contents to verify that
data is only being appended, and not overwritten. To
improve the performance, the operation manager caches
the append-onlyblocks when they are written to the disk
to avoid reading the original contents of block from the
disk during comparison. If a block is not present in the
cache, the constraint manager reads the block and adds
it to the cache before processing the write request. To
speed up comparisons, the operationmanageralso stores
the offsets of end of data inside the append-only blocks.
The newly written data is comparedwith the cached data
until the stored offsets.
When data is appended to the log ﬁle, the atime and
the mtime are also updated in the inode block of the ﬁle
by the ﬁle system. As a result, the ﬁrst block of the
append-only block is overwritten with every update to
the ﬁle. As mentioned earlier, SVSDS does not have the
information about the ﬁle system data structures. Hence,
SVSDS permits the ﬁrst block of the append-onlyﬁles to
be overwritten by the ﬁle system.
SVSDS does not have information about how ﬁle
systems organize its directory data. Hence, enforcing
append-only constraints on directories will only work iff
the new directory entries are added after the existing en-
tries. This also ensures that ﬁles in directories marked as
append-only cannot be deleted. This would help in pre-
venting malicious users from deleting a ﬁle and creating
a symlink to a new ﬁle (for example, an attacker can no
longerunlinka critical ﬁle like /etc/passwd, and then just
creates a new ﬁle in its place).
4.6 Issues
In this section, we talk about some of the issues with
SVSDS. First we talk about the ﬁle system consistency
after reverting back to a previous version inside the disk.
We then talk about the need for a special port on the disk
to provide secure communication. Finally, we talk about
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and possible solutions to
overcome them.
Consistency Although TSDs understand a limited
amount of ﬁle system semantics through pointers, they
are still oblivious to the exact format of ﬁle system-
speciﬁcmeta-dataandhenceitcannotrevertthestatethatis consistent in the viewpoint of speciﬁc ﬁle systems. A
ﬁle system consistency checker (e.g., fsck) needs to be
run after the disk is reverted back to a previous version.
SinceSVSDS internallyuses pointerstotrackblocks,the
consistencycheckershouldalso issueappropriatecallsto
SVSDS to ensure that disk-level pointers are consistent
with ﬁle system pointers.
Administrative Interfaces To prevent unauthorized
users from reverting versions inside the disk, SVSDS
should have a special hardware interface through which
an administrator can log in and revert back versions.
This port can also be used for setting the checkpoint fre-
quency.
Supporting Encryption File Systems EncryptionFile
systems (EFS) can run on top of SVSDS with minimal
modiﬁcations. SVSDS only requires EFS to use TSD’s
API for block allocation and notifying pointer relation-
ship to the disk. The append-only operation-based con-
straint would not work for EFS as end of block can-
not be detected if blocks are encrypted. If encryption
keys are changed across versions and if the administra-
tor reverts back to a previous version, the decryption of
the ﬁle would no longer work. One possible solution is
to change the encryption keys of ﬁles after a capability
based authentication upon which SVSDS would decrypt
all the olderversions and re-encryptthem with the newly
provided keys. The disadvantage with this approach is
that the versioned blocks need to be decrypted and re-
encrypted when the keys are changed.
DoS Attacks SVSDS is vulnerable to denial of service
attacks. There are three issues to be handled: (1) blocks
that are marked for versioning could be repeatedly over-
written; (2) lots of bogus ﬁles could be created to delete
old versions, and (3) versioned ﬁles could be deleted and
recreated again preventing subsequent modiﬁcations to
ﬁles from being versioned inside the disk. To counter at-
tacks of type 1, SVSDS can throttle writes to ﬁles that
are versioned very frequently. An alternative solution to
this problem would be to exponentially increase the ver-
sioning interval of the particular ﬁle / directory that is
being constantly overwritten resulting in fewer number
of versions for the ﬁle. As with most of the denial of
service attacks there is no perfect solution to attack of
type 2. One possible solution would be to stop further
writes to the disk, until some of the space used up by
older versions, are freed up by the administrator through
the administrative interface. The downside of this ap-
proach is that the disk effectively becomes read-only till
the administratorfrees up some space. Type 3 attacks are
not that serious as versioned ﬁles are always backed up
when they are deleted. One possible solution to prevent
versionedﬁles frombeingdeletedis to addno-deleteﬂag
onthe inodeblockofthe ﬁle. This ﬂag wouldbe checked
by SVSDS along with other operation-based constraints
before deleting/modifying the block. The downside of
this approach is that normal users can no longer delete
versioned ﬁles that have been marked as no-delete. The
administrator has to explicitly delete this ﬂag on the no-
delete ﬁles.
5 Implementation
We implemented a prototype SVSDS as a pseudo-device
driver in Linux kernel 2.6.15 that stacks on top of an
existing disk block driver. Figure 5 shows the pseudo
device driver implementation of SVSDS. SVSDS has
7,487 lines of kernel code out of which 3,060 were
reused from an existing TSD prototype. The SVSDS
layer receives all block requests from the ﬁle system,
and re-maps and redirects the common read and write
requests to the lower-level device driver. The additional
primitives required for operations such as block alloca-
tion and pointer management are implemented as driver
ioctls.
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Figure 5: Prototype Implementation of SVSDS
In the current implementationwe maintain all hash ta-
bles(V-TABLE, T-TABLE, P-TABLE,and D-TABLE)as in-
memory data structures. As these hash tables only have
small space requirements, they can be persistently stored
in a portion of the NVRAM inside the disk. This helps
SVSDS to avoid disk I/O for reading these tables.
The read and write requests from ﬁle systems reach
SVSDS through the Block IO (BIO) layer in the Linuxkernel. The BIO layer issues I/O requests with the des-
tination block number, callback function (BI END IO),
and the buffers for data transfer, embedded inside the
BIO data structure. To redirect the block requests from
SVSDS to the underlying disk, we add a new data struc-
ture (BACKUP BIO DATA). This structure stores the des-
tination block number, BI END IO, and BI PRIVATE of
the BIO data structure. The BI PRIVATE ﬁeld is used
by the owner of the BIO request to store private infor-
mation. As I/O request are by default asynchronous
in the Linux kernel, we stored the original contents of
the BIO data structures by replacing the value stored
inside BI PRIVATE to point to our BACKUP BIO DATA
data structure. When I/O requests reach SVSDS, we
replace the destination block number, BI END IO, and
BI PRIVATE in the BIO data structure with the mapped
physical block from the T-TABLE, our callback func-
tion (SVSDS END IO), and the BACKUP BIO DATA re-
spectively. Once the I/O request is completed, the con-
trol reaches our SVSDS END IO function. In this func-
tion, we restore back the original block number and
BI PRIVATE information from the BACKUP BIO DATA
data structure. We then call the BI END IO function
stored in the BACKUP BIO DATA data structure, to notify
the BIO layer that the I/O request is now complete.
We did not make any design changes to the ex-
isting Ext2TSD ﬁle system to support SVSDS. The
Ext2TSD is a modiﬁed version of the Ext2 ﬁle sys-
tem that notiﬁes the pointer relationship to the ﬁle sys-
tem through the TSD disk APIs. To enable users to
select ﬁles and directories for versioning or enforcing
operation-based constraints, we have added three ioctls
namely: VERSION FILE, MARK FILE READONLY, and
MARK FILE APPENDONLY to the Ext2TSD ﬁle system.
All three ioctls take a ﬁle descriptor as their argument,
and gets the inode number from the in-memory inode
data structure. Once the Ext2TSD ﬁle system has the
inode number of the ﬁle, it ﬁnds the the logical block
number that correspond to inode number of the ﬁle. Fi-
nally, we call the the corresponding disk primitive from
the ﬁle system ioctl with logical block number of the in-
ode as the argument. Inside the disk primitive we mark
the ﬁle’s blocks for versioning or enforcing operation-
based constraint by performing a breadth ﬁrst search on
the P-TABLE.
6 Evaluation
We evaluated the performance of our prototype SVSDS
using the Ext2TSD ﬁle system [16]. We ran general-
purpose workloads on our prototype and compared them
with unmodiﬁed Ext2 ﬁle system on a regular disk. This
section is organized as follows: In Section 6.1, we talk
about our test platform, conﬁgurations, and procedures.
Section 6.2 analyzes the performance of the SVSDS
framework for an I/O-intensive workload, Postmark [8].
In Sections 6.3 and 6.4 we analyze the performance on
OpenSSH and kernel compile workloads respectively.
6.1 Test infrastructure
We conductedall tests ona 2.8GHzIntelXeon CPU with
1GB RAM, and a 74GB 10Krpm Ultra-320 SCSI disk.
We used Fedora Core 6 running a vanilla Linux 2.6.15
kernel. To ensure a cold cache, we unmounted all in-
volved ﬁle systems between each test. We ran all tests at
least ﬁve times and computed 95% conﬁdence intervals
for the mean elapsed, system, user, and wait times using
the Student-t distribution. In each case, the half-widths
of the intervals were less than 5% of the mean. Wait time
is the difference between elapsed time and CPU time,
and is affected by I/O and process scheduling.
Unless otherwise mentioned, the system time over-
heads were mainly caused by the hash table lookups
on T-TABLE during the read and write operations and
also due to P-TABLE lookups during CREATE PTR and
DELETE PTR operations. This CPU overhead is due to
the fact that our prototype is implemented as a pseudo-
device driver that runs on the same CPU as the ﬁle sys-
tem. In a real SVSDS setting, the hash table lookups will
be performed by the processor embedded in the disk and
hence will not inﬂuence the overheads on the host sys-
tem, but will add to the wait time.
We have compared the overheads of SVSDS using
Ext2TSD against Ext2 on a regular disk. We denote
Ext2TSD on a SVSDS using the name Ext2Ver. The let-
ters md and all are used to denote selective versioning
of meta-data and all data respectively.
6.2 Postmark
Postmark [8] simulates the operation of electronic mail
and news servers. It does so by performing a series of
ﬁle system operations such as appends, ﬁle reads, direc-
tory lookups, creations, and deletions. This benchmark
uses little CPU but is I/O intensive. We conﬁgured Post-
mark to create 3,000 ﬁles, between 100–200 kilobytes,
and perform 300,000 transactions.
Figure6 showthe performanceofEx2TSDon SVSDS
for Postmark with a versioning interval of 30 seconds.
Postmark deletes all its ﬁles at the end of the benchmark,
so no space is occupied at the end of the test. SVSDS
transparently creates versions and thus, consumes stor-
age space which is not visible to the ﬁle system. The av-
erage number of versions created during this benchmark
is 27.
For Ext2TSD, system time is observed to be 1.1 times
more, and wait time is 8% lesser that of Ext2. The 0
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Figure 6: Postmark results for SVSDS
increase in the system time is because of the hash ta-
ble lookups during CREATE PTR and DELETE PTR calls.
The decrease in the wait time is because, Ext2TSD does
not take into account future growth of ﬁles while allocat-
ing space for ﬁles. This decrease in wait time allowed
Ext2TSD to perform slight better than Ext2 ﬁle system
on a regular disk, but would have had a more signiﬁcant
impact in a benchmark with ﬁles that grow.
For Ext2Ver(md), elapsed time is observed to have no
overhead, system time is 4 times more and wait time is
20% less than that of Ext2. The increase in system time
is due to the additional hash table lookups to locate en-
tries in the T-TABLE. The decrease in wait time is due to
better spacial locality and increased number of requests
being merged inside the disk. This is because the ran-
dom writes (i.e., writing inode block along with writing
the newly allocated block) were converted to sequential
writes due to copy-on-write in versioning.
For Ext2Ver(all), The system time is 4 times more and
wait time is 20% less that of Ext2. The wait time in
Ext2Ver(all)does not have any observableoverheadover
the wait time in Ext2Ver(md). Hence, it is not possible
to explain for the slight increase in the wait time.
6.3 OpenSSH Compile
To show the space overheads of a typical program in-
staller, we compiled the OpenSSH source code. We used
OpenSSH version 4.5, and analyzed the overheads of
Ext2 on a regular disk, Ext2TSD on a TSD, and meta-
data and all data versioning in Ext2TSD on SVSDS
for the untar, configure, and make stages combined.
Since the entire benchmarkcompletedin 60–65seconds,
we used a 2 second versioning interval to create more
versions of blocks. On an average, 10 versions were
created. This is because the pdﬂush deamon starts writ-
ing the modiﬁed ﬁle system blocks to disk after 30 sec-
onds. As a result, the disk does not get any write request
for blocks during the ﬁrst 30 seconds of the OpenSSH
Compile benchmark. The amount of data generated by
this benchmarkwas 16MB. The results for the OpenSSH
compilation are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: OpenSSH Compile Results for SVSDS
For Ext2TSD, we recorded a insigniﬁcant increase in
elapsedtime andsystemtime, anda 108%increasein the
wait time over Ext2. Since the elapsed and system times
are similar, it is not possible to quantify for the increase
in wait time.
For Ext2Ver(md), we recorded a 7% increase in
elapsed time, and a 41% increase in system time over
Ext2. The increase in system time overhead is due to the
additional hash table lookups by SVL to remap the read
and write requests. Ext2Ver(md) consumed 496KB of
additional disk space to store the versions.
For Ext2Ver(all), we recorded a 7% increase in
elapsed time, and a 39% increase in system time over
Ext2. Ext2Ver(all) consumes 15MB of additional space
to store the versions. The overhead of storing versions
is 95%. From this benchmark, we can clearly see that
the versioning all data inside the disk is not very useful,
especially for program installers.6.4 Kernel Compile
To simulate a CPU-intensive user workload, we com-
piled the Linux kernel source code. We used a vanilla
Linux 2.6.15 kernel and analyzed the overheads of
Ext2TSD on a TSD and Ext2TSD on SVSDS with ver-
sioning of all blocks and selective versioning of meta-
data blocks against regular Ext2, for the untar, make
oldconfig, and make operations combined. We used
30 second versioning interval and 78 versions were cre-
ated during this benchmark. The results are shown in
Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Kernel Compile results for SVSDS.
ForExt2TSD,elapsed time is observedto be the same,
system time overheadis 4% lower and wait time is lower
by 24% than that of Ext2. The decrease in the wait time
is because Ext2TSD does not consider future growth of
ﬁles while allocating new blocks.
For Ext2Ver(md), elapsed time is observed to be the
same, systemtimeoverheadis5%, andwaittimeis lower
by 6% than that of Ext2. The increase in wait time in re-
lation to ext2TSD is due to versioning meta-data blocks
which affect the locality of the stored ﬁles. The space
overhead of versioning meta-data blocks is 51 MB.
For Ext2Ver(all), elapsed time is observed to be indis-
tinguishable, system time overhead is 10% higher than
that ofExt2. Theincreasein system timeis duetothe ad-
ditional hash table lookups required for storing the map-
ping informationin the V-TABLE. The space overheadof
versioning all blocks is 181 MB.
7 Related Work
SVSDS borrows ideas from many of the previous works.
The idea of versioningat the granularityof ﬁles has been
explored in many ﬁle systems [6,10,12,15,19]. These
ﬁle systems maintain previous versions of ﬁles primarily
to help users to recover from their mistakes. The main
advantage of SVSDS over these systems is that, it is de-
coupled from the client operating system. This helps in
protecting the versioned data, even in the event of an in-
trusion or an operating system compromise. The virtu-
alization of disk address space has been implemented in
several systems [3,7,9,13,21]. For example, the Log-
ical disk [3] separated the ﬁle-system implementation
from the disk characteristics by providing a logical view
of the block device. The Storage Virtualization Layer
in SVSDS is analogous to their logical disk layer. The
operation-based constraints in SVSDS is a scaled down
version of access control mechanisms. We now compare
andcontrastSVSDS withotherdisk-leveldataprotection
systems: S4 [20], TRAP [23], and Peabody [7].
The Self-Securing Storage System (S4) is an object-
based disk that internally audits all requests that arrive
at the disk. It protects data in compromised systems by
combining log-structuring with journal-based meta-data
versioning to prevent intruders from tampering or per-
manently deleting the data stored on the disk. SVSDS
on the other hand, is a block-based disk that protect data
by transparently versioning blocks inside the disk. The
guaranteesprovidedbyS4 holdtrue only duringthe win-
dow of time in which it versions the data. When the disk
runs out of storage space, S4 stops versioning data un-
til the cleaner thread can free up space for versioning
to continue. As S4 is designed to aid in intrusion di-
agnosis and recovery, it does not provide any ﬂexibility
to users to version ﬁles (i.e, objects) inside the disk. In
contrast, SVSDS allows users to select ﬁles and direc-
tories for versioning inside the disk. The disadvantage
with S4 is that, it does not provide any protection mech-
anism to prevent modiﬁcations to stored data during in-
trusions and always depends on the versioned data to re-
cover from intrusions. In contrast, SVSDS attempts to
prevent modiﬁcations to stored data during intrusions by
enforcing operation-based constraints on system and log
ﬁles.
Timely Recovery to any Point-in-time (TRAP) is a
disk array architecture that provides data recovery in
three different modes. The three modes are: TRAP-1
that takes snapshots at periodic time intervals; TRAP-
3 that provides timely recovery to any point in time at
the block device level (this mode is popularly known as
ContinuousData Protection in storage); TRAP-4 is sim-
ilar to RAID-5, where a log of the parities is kept for
each block write. The disadvantage with this system isthat, it cannot provide TRAP-2 (data protection at the
ﬁle-level) as their block-based disk lacks semantic infor-
mation about the data stored in the disk blocks. Hence,
TRAP ends up versioning all the blocks. TRAP-1 is
similar to our current implementation where an adminis-
trator can choose a particular interval to version blocks.
We have implemented TRAP-2, or ﬁle-level versioning
insidethediskasSVSDShassemanticinformationabout
blocks stored on the disk through pointers. TRAP-3 is
similar to the mode in SVSDS where the time between
creating versions is set to zero. Since SVSDS runs on
a local disk, it cannot implement the TRAP-4 level of
versioning.
Peabody is a network block storage device, that vir-
tualizes the disk space to provide the illusion of a sin-
gle large disk to the clients. It maintains a centralized
repositoryof sectors and tries to reduce the space utiliza-
tion by coalescing blocks across multiple virtual disks
that contain the same data. This is done to improve the
cache utilization and to reduce the total amount of stor-
age space. Peabody versions data by maintaining write
logs and transaction logs. The write logs stores the pre-
vious contents of blocks before they are overwritten, and
the transaction logs contain information about when the
block was written, location of the block, and the con-
tent hashes of the blocks. The disadvantage with this ap-
proach is that it cannot selectively versions blocks inside
the disk.
8 Conclusions
Data protection against attackers with OS root privileges
is fundamentally a hard problem. While there are nu-
merous security mechanisms that can protect data under
variousthreat scenarios, onlyveryfew ofthem can be ef-
fective when the OS is compromised. In view of the fact
that it is virtually impossible to eliminate all vulnerabil-
ities in the OS, it is useful to explore how best we can
recover from damages once a vulnerability exploit has
been detected. In this paper, we have taken this direc-
tion and explored how a disk-level recovery mechanism
can be implemented,while still allowingﬂexible policies
in tune with the higher-level abstractions of data. We
have also shown how the disk system can enforce simple
constraints that can effectively protect key executables
and log ﬁles. Our solution that combines the advantages
of a software and a hardware-level mechanism proves to
be an effective choice against alternative methods. Our
evaluation of our prototype implementation of SVSDS
shows that performanceoverheadsare negligiblefornor-
mal user workloads.
Future Work . Our current design supports reverting
the entire disk state to an older version. In future, we
plan to work on supporting more ﬁne-grained recovery
policies to revertspeciﬁc ﬁles ordirectoriesto theirolder
versions. SVSDS inits currentform,reliesonthe admin-
istrator to detect an intrusion and revert back to a previ-
ously known safe state. We plan to build a storage-based
intrusion detection system [14] inside SVSDS. Our sys-
tem would do better than the system developed by Pen-
nington et al. [14] as we also have data dependencies
conveyedthroughpointers. We also plan to exploremore
operation-based constraints that can be supported at the
disk-level.
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